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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BAUM d/b/a 
BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
DEAN KNIGHT, d/b/a 
THE FASHION CORNER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20493 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT MICHAEL BAUM 
d/b/a BAUMWEAR BY MICHAEL BAUM 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court below properly find that Mark Grayson 
was not an agent of respondent but more closely allied 
to the appellant, Knight. 
2. Did the lower Court properly find that written 
authorization was required before goods could be returned 
and that the appellant Knight returned the goods without 
authorization. 
3* Whether the appellant Knight was entitled to reject 
the goods as failing to conform to the contract. 
4. Whether the goods failed to conform to express 
or implied warranties. 
5. Whether the appellant made a timely or seasonable 
rejection of goods. 
6. Whether the lower Court properly assessed damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a money judgment entered 
the 10th day of January, 1985, for the respondent and against 
the appellant on a contract of sale of certain merchandise. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have this Court uphold the 
judgment entered by The Honorable Leonard H. Russon in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-204(2)(3) (1953) provides: 
"(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any 
action depends on the nature, purposes and 
circumstances of such action. 
(3) An action is taken 'seasonably1 when it 
is taken at or within the time agreed or if no 
time is agreed at or within a reasonable time." 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(b) (1953) provides: 
"(b) when the buyer before entering into the 
contract has examined the goods or the sample 
or model as fully as he desired or has refused 
to examine the goods or the sample or model as 
fully as he desired or has refused to examine 
the goods there is no implied warranty with regard 
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to defects which an examination ought in the 
circumstances to have revealed to him; and" 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-326(1)(a)(b) (1953) provides: 
"Sale on approval and sale or return—Consignment 
sales and rights of creditors.—(1) Unless 
otherwise agreed, if delivered goods may be 
returned by the buyer even though they conform 
to the contract, the transaction is 
(a) a 'sale on approval1 if the goods are 
delivered primarily for use, and 
(b) a 'sale or return' if the goods are delivered 
primarily for resale." 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-601 (1953) provides: 
"Buyer's rights on improper delivery.—Subject 
to the provisions of this chapter on breach in 
installment contracts (section 70A-2-612) and 
unless otherwise ageed under the sections on 
contractual limitations of remedy (section 
70A-2-718 and 70A-2-719), if the goods or the 
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform 
to the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and 
reject the rest." 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(l) (1953) provides: 
"Manner and effect of rightful rejection—(1) 
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable 
time after their delivery or tender. It is 
ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies 
the seller." 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602(2)(a) (1953) provides: 
"(a) after rejection any exercise of ownership 
by the buyer with respect to any commercial unit 
is wrongful as against the seller; and . . . " 
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EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
"Tr." shall refer to the specific page in the record 
of the lower Court. 
"Ex." will refer to an Exhibit introduced into evidence 
at trial and there will also be reference to the Deposition 
of Mark Grayson by specific page. The parties stipulated 
that the deposition could be used at trial since Mr. Grayson 
was not within the jurisdiction of the Court at time of 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of trial the respondent, Michael Baum, 
was the self-employed owner of two related businesses in 
Ithaca, New York. The first, known as "High Gear" was 
a retail clothing store. The second, was a wholesale 
tee-shirt imprinting business known as the "Printers Galary." 
(Tr. 225) 
Respondent was educated in various facets of the garmet 
business and graduated from Cornell University with a BS 
in print making and silk screen printing. (Tr. 225) 
In 1980, the respondent and his father formed a 
partnership called Baumwear, which manufactured women's 
apparel for wholesale distribution. In 1982, "Baumwear" 
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became respondent's sole proprietorship. (Tr. 226; Ex. 
1) 
Baumwear was a one-man operation with respondent 
designing the look of the garment, securing the 
subcontractors to produce the garments, selling to the 
stores, shipping the goods, and billing and collecting 
the accounts. (Tr. 227) 
Respondent sold his goods in two ways. Either through 
personal contact with various buyers or through the use 
of sales representatives who would display Baumwear samples 
and sell through the use of said samples. (Tr. 227) Sales 
representatives represented from ten to fifteen different 
manufacturers. The reps generally maintained showrooms 
where buyers could view the Baumwear merchandise. Orders 
received by the reps were then forwarded to respondent 
to fill. (Tr. 228, 229) 
Customers of Baumwear ranged from small boutiques 
to large department stores such as Macys. (Tr. 228) 
In 1982, the respondent manufactured a fall line of 
merchandise. The merchandise consisted of four or five 
styles which would be categorized as contemporary junior 
sportswear and was constructed of two-tone plaid sweatshirt 
fabric. The garment itself had panels sewn into them which 
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had been printed at Baumwear's shop in Ithaca. (Tr. 229, 
230) 
Because of a serious medical problem the respondent 
ceased doing business in October, 1982f and just prior 
to the cessation of business was looking to sell off the 
remainder of the fall inventory since his lease was up 
at the end of the month. (Tr. 232; Tr. 234) 
In the process of selling the remaining merchandise, 
respondent on or about the 26th day of October
 f 1982, met 
with a man by the name of Mark Grayson who indicated to 
the respondent that he was doing research for a friend 
in the clothing business out west and was interested in 
respondent's goods. That day Mark Grayson inspected the 
goods, in fact, " [h]e went over them with a fine tooth 
comb, so to speak." (Tr. 233) Respondent then told Grayson 
that he would be willing to make a very large discount 
off the original line price because he was getting out 
of the business, had to get rid of the merchandise and 
his lease would expire at the end of the month. (Tr. 234) 
After the inspection, Mr. Grayson called the appellant, 
Dean Knight, at his business, The Fashion Corner, in Utah 
giving him a description of the merchandise. Subsequently, 
the respondent spoke to appellant by phone giving him a 
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detailed description of the merchandise as to construction, 
quality and sizing. (Tr. 235) 
Mr. Grayson then prepared an invoice reflecting the 
agreed terms so that the respondent could begin to prepare 
the goods for shipment. Mr. Grayson signed as buyer. 
The terms of sale included that there would be no returns 
without written authorization. (Tr. 236, Ex. 3-P) 
The next day after checking the appellant's credit 
worthiness the respondent once again called the appellant 
in Utah and explained that he (appellant) was getting the 
merchandise at a cutthroat price because respondent was 
going out of business and that respondent had no intention 
of taking the merchandise back under any circumstances. 
Respondent was then informed by appellant, that Mark Grayson 
was basically his eyes and ears in New York City, that 
he had worked closely with Mark for many years and that 
if Mark said the merchandise was okay, then respondent 
should not worry. (Tr. 238) 
On October 28, 1982, the respondent prepared an invoice 
and shipped the goods. In the body of the document the 
following appeared: 
SHIPPED FREIGHT COLLECT 
Terms Net 10 Days E.O.M. — No discounts 
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Amount due in full by 12-10-82 or earlier. 
Please note new address above. 
ORDER COMPLETE -- THANK YOU 
(Tr. 239, Ex. 4-P) 
The unit prices of the merchandise reflected a 
substantial discount from the prices at which the same 
merchandise had been previously sold. (Tr. 239, Ex. 2-P 
& Ex. 4-P) The total cost of the goods shipped was 
$13,392.50, which was never paid by the appellant to 
respondent. (Tr. 239, 266, Ex. 4-P) 
The respondent then had no additional contact with 
either appellant or Mr. Grayson until the 7th day of 
December, 1982, when respondent called appellant to remind 
him that a check was due in a couple of days. It was at 
that time that the respondent for the first time heard 
that appellant had a problem with the goods and wanted 
to return the goods. (Tr. 241) During that conversation 
respondent once again reiterated that the goods were not 
returnable and would not be accepted. (Tr. 241) 
On the 21st day of December, 1982, the appellant sent 
the goods freight collect to Ithaca, New York. The goods 
arrived in Ithaca on January 11, 1983 but were refused 
by respondent. (Tr. 242, Ex. 6-P) 
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By January, when the goods arrived in Ithaca, they 
were worthless since they were seasonal goods (fall to 
winter) which should have been sold to retail stores no 
later than the end of October to meet the Thanksgiving 
and Christmas selling season. In January, stores typically 
begin to sell their spring lines and since the subject 
goods were sweatshirt fabric with dark colors, they obviously 
would not sell as spring merchandise. (Tr. 243, 244) 
Although appellant called Mr. Grayson about the problem 
with the goods, Grayson did not call respondent and, in 
fact, told appellant that respondent's company was no longer 
at the address in New York and further told him it was 
not a good idea to send the goods back without trying to 
sell them. (Deposition of Grayson at page 38) Grayson did, 
however, testify contrary to appellant that he had the 
Ithaca address and respondent's phone number. (Deposition 
of Grayson at page 35) Grayson then offered to sell the 
goods for appellant and was told to sell the goods for 
$5.00. (Deposition of Grayson at page 38) Grayson and 
appellant then undertook to attempt to sell the goods through 
jobbers in Florida and California but at no time did Grayson 
have authority to do anything for appellant in regard to 
the merchandise. (Deposition of Grayson at page 36) 
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Only after the Florida and California jobbers had 
rejected the merchandiser did appellant send the goods 
to Ithaca. (Tr. 282) The appellant testified that Grayson 
had to secure the Ithaca address for the appellant so that 
he would be able to return the merchandise, however, the 
Ithaca address was on the invoice sent to appellant's address 
in October, and as indicated Grayson testified in his 
deposition that he had had both respondent's address and 
phone number. 
At the conclusion of the trial counsel submitted trial 
briefs. On the 18th day of December, 1984, the Court 
Memorandum Decision, which included the following findings: 
A. That the appellant offered to sell the appellant 
going-out~of-business discount, the goods in question. 
B. That the appellant, Knight, knew that the respondent 
was going out of business, that the respondent was required 
to vacate his premises immediately and that respondent 
was moving out of the city of New York City. 
C. That the appellant waived the receiving of a sample 
because of his knowledge of respondent's urgency in disposing 
of the goods. 
D. That appellant accepted the offer and authorized 
shipment of the goods; that the purchase order was signed 
by Grayson for appellant and that the puchase order 
specifically required written authorization for any goods 
to be returned. 
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E. That respondent told the appellant at the time 
of the sale that such sale was final and that he could 
not take back the goods and that the appellant in response 
thereto indicated that he had faith in Grayson and could 
always unload the goods if he did not like them. 
F. That the appellant attempted on his own to sell 
the goods on his own invoice subsequent to receipt of the 
same in Salt Lake City. 
G. That after appellant's failure to sell the goods 
on his own invoice he then attempted to return the same 
but was refused but sent the goods anyway without written 
authorization. 
H. That the appellant never attempted to contact 
the respondent in regards to return of the goods until 
it was to late for these seasonal goods to be moved. 
I. That the appellant knew from the beginning of 
the respondent's moving from New York City back to Ithaca 
but made no attempt to locate the respondent in a timely 
manner. 
J. That the appellant admits that some manufacturers 
require written authorization before goods are returned. 
K. That the goods in question were not defective 
but the appellant simply did not like the aesthetics when 
receiving the same in Salt Lake City. 
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L. That the goods were described to the appellant 
by Grayson and by the respondent prior to and at the time 
of sale. 
M. That the appellant knew the goods were seasonable 
but made no timely effort to contact the respondent. 
N. That Grayson was not an employee or agent of 
respondent but in fact a freelancer representative who 
in this case was more allied with the appellant than 
respondent. 
0* That this was not a "approval sale" and Grayson 
had no authority to bind the respondent. (Tr. 189, 190, 
191) 
Subsequently, the Court entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment granting judgment to 
respondent and against appellant in the principal sum of 
$13,392.50. (Tr. 196, 197, 198, 199, 202 & 203) No 
objection was made by the appellant to the entry of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
SUMMARY OF AGRUMENT 
It is respondent's position that the lower Court 
properly held that he was entitled to judgment for 
appellant's failure to pay for goods received and that 
his attempt to reject the goods was wrongful within the 
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meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code and that the judgment 
of the lower Court should be affirmed with costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE SUBJECT 
TRANSACTION WAS NOT AN "APPROVAL SALE" WHICH 
WOULD ALLOW THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT TO RETURN 
THE SUBJECT MERCHANDISE EVEN THOUGH THEY DID 
NOT NECESSARILY CONFORM TO THE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-326(1)(a)(b) provides: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, if delivered goods 
may be returned by the buyer even though they 
conform to the contract, the transaction is 
(a) a 'sale on approval1 if the goods are 
delivered primarily for use, and 
(b) a 'sale or return1 if the goods are delivered 
primarily for resale." 
Although the goods were being delivered for resale, 
the Court nevertheless properly found that the parties 
had not agreed that the appellant would be receiving the 
goods on approval or with the right to return the goods 
even though they may conform to the contract. Both Grayson 
and respondent explained to the appellant that the respondent 
was moving and had to get rid of the goods. (Tr. 234, 235) 
In fact the appellant knew that he was getting such a deep 
discount because of this fact and actually waived receiving 
samples. (Deposition of Grayson at pages 24 & 25) 
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Therefore, any return of the goods was unauthorized 
and a breach of the sales contract between the appellant 
and respondent. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S REJECTION OF THE SUBJECT GOODS WAS 
UNJUSTIFIED SINCE SAID GOODS CONFORMED IN EVERY 
RESPECT TO THE CONTRACT. 
Under most circumstances a buyer has a right to reject 
goods which do not conform to the contract of sale. 
Rejection of course is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-2-601, which provides: 
"Buyer's rights on improper delivery.—Subject 
to the provisions of this chapter on breach in 
installment contracts (section 70A-2-612) and 
unless otherwise agreed under the sections on 
contractual limitations of remedy (sections 7 0A-2-
718 and 70A-2-719), if the goods or the tender 
of delivery fail in any respect to conform to 
the contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and 
reject the rest." 
Of course in appellant's Third Defense to respondent's 
Complaint appellant raised as defenses nonconformity stating: 
"The goods delivered by plaintiff to defendant 
failed to conform in several material respects 
to the contract between the parties in that the 
goods were of extremely poor quality and were 
otherwise not as represented by plaintiff, [sic] 
and his agents, and were completely unusable 
by defendant." 
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(Tr. 7) Yet, the record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever 
that the goods were defective and in fact the Court found 
the goods were not defective but that the appellant simply 
did not like the asethetics of the goods when they arrived 
in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 190-198) Of course, appellant 
acknowleges that this finding is consistent with the 
evidence. 
Additionally both the respondent and Mark Grayson 
described the merchandise in detail (Tr. 234, 235, Deposition 
of Grayson at p. 13) and there was further testimony that 
the appellant informed the respondent that Mr. Grayson 
was basically his eyes and ears in New York City, so how 
could the goods not conform. 
As here, when the only evidence is that the subject 
goods are conforming but buyer returns the goods for the 
reason that they are not as he perceived them, he is 
rejecting conforming goods and breaches his contract. R.R. 
Waites Co. v. E.H. Thrift Air Conditioning, Inc. (1974, 
MO App.) 510 SW 2d. 759, 15 UCCRS 43. And where there 
has been a wrongful rejection, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-703 
applies and provides for seller's remedies, which include 
an action for the contract purchase price, the remedy 
respondent chose. See also Cochran v. Horner, (1970) 121 
Ga. App. 297, 173 SE 2d. 448, 7 UCCRS 707. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT MARK GRAYSON WAS 
NOT THE AGENT OF RESPONDENT. 
Appellant takes inconsistent positions that an agency 
relationship actually existed between respondent and Mark 
Grayson and also at the same time urge that Mark Grayson 
had apparent authority from respondent to receive notice 
of rejection of the goods. The lower Court found that 
Grayson was not an employee or agent of the respondent 
but merely a freelancer representative who was actually 
more allied with the appellant than with the respondent. 
(Tr. 191 & 198) The evidence, of course, absolutely 
supports this position. 
Under normal circumstances agency is created by 
agreement of the parties. There must be a meeting of the 
minds and the consent of both the principal and agent is 
necessary to create such an agency. Naify v. Pacific Indem. 
Co. 11 Cal 2d 5, 76 P2d 663, 115 ALR 476; Ruddy v. Oregon 
Auto. Credit Corp. 179 Or 688, 174 P2d 603; Continental 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796 
(1963). 
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A specific definition of agency is found in Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § lf and states as follows: 
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which results 
from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf 
and subject to his control, and consent by the 
other so to act." 
Here, there is no manifestation of consent, in fact the 
evidence taken strictly from Grayson indicates anything 
but and is as follows: 
(a) That he was a freelance sales rep; (Deposition 
of Grayson at page 8) 
(b) That Grayson had had over 100 transactions with 
the appellant, only 1 with respondent; (Deposition of Grayson 
at page 15) 
(c) That at the time Grayson was leaving the loft 
respondent had not unquivocably stated that he was going 
to ship the order to appellant; (Deposition of Grayson 
at page 29) 
(d) That Grayson had signed the purchase order for 
buyer (appellant); (Deposition of Mark Grayson at page 
34, Ex. 3-P) 
(e) Grayson indicated that respondent gave him no 
instructions on what do to if appellant called him; and 
(Deposition of Mark Grayson at page 39) 
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(f) That he (Grayson) had no authority to bind the 
manfucturer (respondent) to a contract. (Deposition of 
Mark Grayson at page 66) 
As can be seen, if there is any manifestation of consent, 
the manifestation would indicate that as the Court properly 
found Grayson was more closely allied to appellant and 
was not the agent of the respondent. 
Apparent authority is a principal of law which is 
an exception to the requirement that there be an agreement 
of the parties to establish agency. Mailia v. Giles, 100 
Utah 562, 114 P.2d 208 (1941). The doctrine of apparent 
authority creates agency where no agreement exists where 
the principal permits the agent to exercise authority 
allowing third parties to rely on such authority. Apparent 
authority is determined from the facts and circumstances 
surrounding each individual situation. United States Bank 
& Finance Corp. v. National Building & Loan, 80 Utah 62, 
12 P.2d 758 (1932). 
The burden of proof here rests with the appellant 
since it is he that has raised apparent authority of the 
Mark Grayson. Southern Surety Co. v. Gilkey-Duff Hardware 
Co. , 166 Okla. 84, 26 P. 2d 144. The appellant must also 
prove not only that there is apparent authority or agency 
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but what the nature and extent of the agency is. Butinel 
v. Nygren, 17 Ariz. 491f 154 P. 1042. Where the existence 
of agency depends on the acts of the parties, as is the 
case here, the law makes no presumption of agency. It 
is a fact that must be proven. Fox v. Lavendar, 89 Utah 
115, 56 P.2d 1049; and also Smith v. Leber, 34 Wash. 
2d 211, 209 P.2d 297. 
Here, of course, there is no question that there was 
no formal agency relationship and, therefore, appellant 
can only prevail if agency can be implied from the course 
of dealing and the facts surrounding the transaction. 
The facts are that respondent and Mr. Grayson had had only 
one contact, that being the subject transaction. On the 
other hand, Grayson had had hundreds of contacts with the 
appellant. The facts are also that the respondent negotiated 
the contract, while Grayson only made the initial contact 
with appellant. Grayson, in fact, had no further contact 
with the appellant until appellant called complaining about 
the goods
 f at which time appellant was told by Grayson 
that it was not a good idea to return the goods and that 
appellant should attempt to sell them. (Deposition of Grayson 
at page 38) Subsequently, appellant exercised total control 
of the goods and authorized Grayson to sell them for him 
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for $5.00. Based on the foregoing the Court properly found 
that Grayson was not respondent's agent and certainly it 
is apparent from the facts and circumstances of the 
transaction that Mark Grayson was not respondent's agent 
for the purpose of accepting appellant's alleged rejection 
of the goods. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF BREACH OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTY. 
Appellant has raised as a defense, breach of implied 
warranties of merchantability. The evidence, however, 
is limited on this point and it would seem that appellant's 
only objection to the goods was some type of objection 
as to the asethetics of the goods. Torturing this to be 
merchantability the Uniform Commercial Code provides for 
the exclusion of such warranties, under certain 
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(b) provides 
as follows: 
"when the buyer before entering into the contract 
has examined the goods or the sample or model 
as fully as he desired or has refused to examine 
the goods there is no warranty with regard to 
defects which an examination ought to in the 
circumstances to have revealed to him; and" 
The buyer therefore waives any implied warranty by 
making an examination or by refusing to examine the goods. 
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Durbano Metals, Inc. v. A & K R.R. Materials, 574 P.2d 
1159 (1978). Here, Grayson, appellant's eyes and ears 
in New York City actually examined the goods and certainly 
any problems of merchantability should have been discovered. 
Even if the examination of Grayson is found not to constitute 
examination by the appellant, the appellant waived examining 
a sample and, therefore, waived any implied warranties 
including merchantability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-316(3)(c) provides as follows: 
"(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded 
or modified by course of dealing or course of 
performance or usage of trade." 
The course of dealing as relates to this respondent 
and this appellant was a one-time transaction. Buyer was 
told by both Grayson and the respondent that the goods 
could not be returned which certainly modifies any implied 
or express warranty and although there is no writing relating 
to the disclaimer, the Courts are giving effect to oral 
disclaimers of warranties when knowlingly made by the buyer 
as was the case here. Robinson v. Branch Moving & Storage 
Co., (1976) 28 NC App. 244, 221 SE 2d. 81, 18 UCCRS 896. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the goods were shipped 
pursuant to the condition that there would be no returns 
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without written authorization. (Ex. 3-P) When appellant 
contacted Grayson, Grayson said to keep the goods and try 
to sell them and gave no written authorization to return 
them. Subsequently, appellant talked directly with the 
respondent, who told him that he would not accept the goods 
and certainly he gave no written authorization. The 
appellant then waited an even longer time before arbitrarily 
returning the goods without any authorization whatsoever, 
which of course was a breach of the sales contract entitling 
respondent to move forward with the suit as he did. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT DID NOT MAKE TIMELY OR SEASONABLE 
REJECTION OF THE SUBJECT GOODS. 
The Court found that the appellant knew the goods 
were seasonable but made no timely effort to contact the 
respondent for the purposes of rejection. (Tr. 190) Even 
if this Court were to find that the appellant had the right 
to reject the goods, it must find that the appellant failed 
to properly reject the merchandise. Utah Code Ann. § 
70A-2-601 provides that if goods fail to conform to the 
contract, the buyer may: 
"(a) reject the whole; or 
(b) accept the whole; or 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units 
and reject the rest." 
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Further, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602 provides the manner 
in which rightful rejection may be accomplished, to wit: 
"(1) Rejection of goods must be within a 
reasonable time after their delivery or tender. 
It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably 
notifies the seller." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-204(2)(3) defines both reasonable 
and seasonably as follows: 
"(2) What is reasonable time for taking any 
action depends on the nature, purpose and 
circumstances of such action." 
"(3) An action is taken 'seasonably1 when it 
is taken at or within the time agreed or if no 
time is agreed, at or within a reasonable time." 
Both definitions require reasonableness to be looked at 
by the tryer of fact in view of the circumstances surrounding 
the transaction. The goods were themselves seasonable. 
They had to be on the shelves by mid-November. The only 
notice of rejection that appellant gave was a telephone 
conversation with Mark Grayson. The respondent did not 
know of any such rejection until sometime in December and 
the goods were not actually returned until several days 
after that time arriving in Ithaca, New York in January, 
long after the goods could be sold. Additionally, after 
notifying Grayson, appellant sent samples in an attempt 
to sell the goods to other individuals. If appellant was 
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attempting rejection as he indicated in his testimony by 
calling Grayson, then the rejection, was wrongful because 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602 (2) (a) which 
states: 
"after rejection any exercise of ownership by 
the buyer with respect to any commercial unit 
is wrongful as against the seller; and . . . " 
In exercising the ownership, appellant withdrew any 
rejection or at the very least wrongfully rejected. After 
appellant was unable to sell the goods to the third parties, 
he made no attempt to contact respondent even through the 
alleged agent Grayson. After the respondent had called 
appellant in December, appellant waited an additional two 
weeks before sending the goods. The appellant knew the 
goods were seasonal and that the delay made them valueless. 
POINT VI 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES. 
The appellant would have this Court believe that the 
respondent failed to mitigate his damages and failed to 
introduce evidence relative to the market value of the 
goods. This could not be further from the truth. In the 
first place appellant returned the goods freight collect 
on December 21, 1982. They did not arrive in Ithaca, New 
York until January 11, 1983. (Tr. 242, Ex. P-6) Subsequently, 
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the goods were sold to cover the freight charges. So if 
mitigation was necessary by respondent, the sale to cover 
the freight costs constitute any required mitigation on 
the part of respondent. 
With reference to the introduction of evidence relative 
to the market value, if such a burden exists, the respondent 
met that burden in his testimony at trial wherein he 
indicated that by January the goods were worthless. (Tr. 
4, 244) The record is totally devoid of any other evidence 
that would indicate that the goods had a market value and, 
therefore, the $13,000 + judgment should stand. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent urges this Court 
to affirm the judgment entered in the lower Court with 
costs. 
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